fix(core/api): gate PII reads + enumeration endpoints#83
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Closes the read-side audit findings. Most of these don't let an
attacker change state, but they leak PII (emails, phone numbers,
external identity pairings, login history) and authorization signals
(group memberships, owner_ids) to unauthenticated callers.
Self / admin / internal-only reads (Any of: sentinel:all, bearer's
entity/user matches the target, RequestUserIsAdmin):
- GET /core/entity/:entityID (GetEntityByID)
- GET /core/entity/:entityID/groups (GetEntityGroups)
- GET /core/entity/:entityID/memberships (GetEntityMemberships)
- GET /core/entity/:entityID/logins (GetEntityLogins)
- GET /users/:id (GetUserByID)
- GET /users/:id/groups (GetUserGroups)
Admin / internal-only reads:
- GET /applications/client/:clientID (GetApplicationByClientID) —
leaks owner_id + metadata
Internal-only reads (sentinel:all):
- GET /core/entity/external/:provider (ListExternalAuthsByProvider)
- GET /core/entity/external/:provider/:externalID
(GetEntityByExternalAuth) — discord-id → entity reverse lookup
- GET /core/applications/client/:clientID/groups (was unauth — used
by oauth's BuildTokenClaims, which now carries sentinel:all)
- POST /core/saml/sp/resolve (ResolveSAMLServiceProvider) — used by
the saml service, which carries sentinel:all
Internal services (oauth/discord/saml) carry sentinel:all on their
SA bearers, so they keep working through the new gates. External
callers attempting to enumerate or harvest PII now get 401/403.
Last in the stack of "harden core API gates" PRs. After this lands,
core has gates on every endpoint that was previously ungated from
the post-s2s-auth audit.
This was referenced Jun 17, 2026
This was referenced Jun 17, 2026
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Stacked on top of #82 — base is `bk1031/harden-user-entity-gates`. Final in the harden-core-api-gates stack.
Audit holes covered
These don't let an attacker change state, but they leak PII and authorization signals to unauthenticated callers.
MEDIUM:
LOW:
Gate model
Self / admin / internal:
```go
Require(c, Any(
RequestTokenHasScope(c, "sentinel:all"),
RequestTokenHasEntityID(c, entityID), // or RequestTokenHasUserID for /users/*
RequestUserIsAdmin(c),
))
```
Internal-only (sentinel:all): the discord-id reverse lookup, external-auth enumeration, internal route variants. The respective non-core services now carry sentinel:all via PR #79.
After this lands
Every endpoint flagged in the post-s2s-auth audit has a gate. `CheckUsername` is left open (intentional — signup form needs it) and `POST /core/applications/verify` stays open (its own constant-time client_id/secret check is the auth). Everything else either requires a bearer or rejects.
Test plan